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Athenian Road Kill (Dem. 23.53) 
 
 
According to a famous passage in Demosthenes, “It was permitted to kill a highwayman who 
waylaid one on a road.”1 The law is quoted at 23.53:  
 
Ἐάν τις ἀποκτείνῃ ἐν ἄθλοις ἄκων, ἢ ἐν ὁδῷ καθελὼν ἢ ἐν πολέµῳ ἀγνοήσας, ἢ ἐπὶ δάµαρτι 
ἢ ἐπὶ µητρὶ ἢ ἐπ’ ἀδελφῇ ἢ ἐπὶ θυγατρί, ἢ ἐπὶ παλλακῇ ἣν ἂν ἐπ’ ἐλευθέροις παισὶν ἔχῃ, 
τούτων ἕνεκα µὴ φεύγειν κτείναντα. 
 
If one kills unwillingly in games, or by pulling (someone) down in the road, or having failed 
to recognize (a comrade) in war, or (if one kills a man who is) with a wife, or with a mother, 
or with a sister, or with a daughter, or with a concubine kept for purpose of producing free 
offspring, he shall not, for these (acts) go into exile for having killed.2 
 
It is worrisome that the phrase ἐν ὁδῷ καθελών suggests nothing about self-defense, highway 
robbery, or ambush, which are widely regarded as the essential elements of this claim to lawful 
homicide. It is even more worrisome that in the exegesis that follows the quotation, Demosthenes 
does not even mention this clause.3 Neither does the Ath.Pol., which includes the other scenarios 
but omits this one altogether: “If one admits to killing, but says that (one killed) in accordance 
with the laws, e.g. having caught a moichos, or unknowingly in war, or competing in games, they 
shall bring him to trial at the Delphinion.”4  
                                                
1 MacDowell 1978: 114; also 1963: 73: “catching him waylaying him,” and 75-76. Also e.g. Todd 1993: 
274n18: “defence against highway robbery” (but cf. Todd 2007: 127: “catching him on the highway”); Phillips 
2008: 60: “killing a highway robber in self-defense,” 2013: 57: “having come upon a highway robber in the road;” 
Lanni 2006: 87: “overpowering someone on the road [i.e. defending oneself from a highway robber].” Carawan 
1998: 92 is cautious: “slaying upon the road.” 
2 Sometimes “shall not defend himself in court as having killed” (µὴ φεύγειν κτείναντα) vel sim. But see 
Gagarin 1981: 114-115n8. “With” cannot adequately capture the force of ἐπὶ; see Carey: 1995: 409-410n9 and 10. 
3 Dem. 23.54-55: καίτοι σκέψασθ’ ὡς ὁσίως καὶ καλῶς ἕκαστα διεῖλεν ὁ ταῦτ’ ἐξ ἀρχῆς διελών. ἄν τις ἐν 
ἄθλοις ἀποκτείνῃ τινά, τοῦτον ὥρισεν οὐκ ἀδικεῖν. διὰ τί; οὐ τὸ συµβὰν ἐσκέψατο, ἀλλὰ τὴν τοῦ δεδρακότος 
διάνοιαν. ἔστι δ’ αὕτη τίς; ζῶντα νικῆσαι καὶ οὐκ ἀποκτεῖναι. εἰ δ’ ἐκεῖνος ἀσθενέστερος ἦν τὸν ὑπὲρ τῆς νίκης 
ἐνεγκεῖν πόνον, ἑαυτῷ τοῦ πάθους αἴτιον ἡγήσατο, διὸ τιµωρίαν οὐκ ἔδωκεν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ. πάλιν ‘ἂν ἐν πολέµῳ’ 
φησὶν ‘ἀγνοήσας,’ καὶ τοῦτον εἶναι καθαρόν. καλῶς· εἰ γὰρ ἐγώ τινα τῶν ἐναντίων οἰηθεὶς εἶναι διέφθειρα, οὐ δίκην 
ὑπέχειν, ἀλλὰ συγγνώµης τυχεῖν δίκαιός εἰµι. ‘ἢ ἐπὶ δάµαρτι’ φησὶν ‘ἢ ἐπὶ µητρὶ ἢ ἐπ’ ἀδελφῇ ἢ θυγατρί, ἢ ἐπὶ 
παλλακῇ ἣν ἂν ἐπ’ ἐλευθέροις παισὶν ἔχῃ,’ καὶ τὸν ἐπὶ τούτων τῳ κτείναντ’ ἀθῷον ποιεῖ, πάντων γ’ ὀρθότατ’, ὦ 
ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦτον ἀφιείς. (And note how piously and well the one who originally defined these things 
defined them. “If someone kills someone in games,” he determined that this man did not do wrong. Why? He did not 
regard the thing that happened, but the intent of the one who had done it. And what is that? To conquer the man 
alive, not to kill. But if that man was too weak to bear the pain for victory’s sake, then he (sc. the lawmaker) thought 
him responsible for the suffering (that befell) him; wherefore he provided no vengeance on his behalf. Fine. For if I 
destroyed someone, because I thought him one of my enemies, it is just for me not to suffer legal exaction but to 
find pardon. “Or with a wife,” he says, “or with a mother or with a daughter, or with a concubine whom he has for 
purpose of free children,” and he makes guiltless anyone who kills a man who is with any of these—most rightly of 
all, Athenian men—letting this man off). 
4 Dem. 57.3: ἐὰν δ’ ἀποκτεῖναι µέν τις ὁµολογῇ, φῇ δὲ κατὰ τοὺς νόµους, οἷον µοιχὸν λαβών, ἢ ἐν πολέµῳ 
ἀγνοήσας, ἢ ἐν ἄθλῳ ἀγωνιζόµενος, τούτ[ῳ] ἐπὶ Δελφινίῳ δικάζουσιν. 
 Why skip it? Carawan suggests that the clause is ancient, but not Draco’s, that “there was 
a later statute recasting the substance of Draconian laws on justifiable killing to be found in the 
enabling ordinance for the Delphinium court,” and that the editor (of Demosthenes) found ἢ ἐν 
ὁδῷ καθελὼν there and inserted it at 53, “probably assum[ing] that the Draconian law of 
justifiable homicide that Demosthenes had read to the court in §53 was the same as the law of the 
Delphinium court to which he alludes in §74.”5 Draconian or not, the phrase is unambiguously 
ancient,6 and Canevaro has concluded that the law as quoted was “already present in the 
Urexemplar.”7 Drerup thought the phrase either corrupt or else archaic and beyond Demosthenes’ 
understanding.8 Gibson urges the latter: “Perhaps [Demosthenes] did not understand the archaic 
expression “seizing on the road” and thus was unable to use it in his argument.”9 Right. 
Harpokration appears to have had no clue. He glosses ἢ ἐν ὁδῶι καθελών with “meaning seizing 
someone who is lying in ambush, i.e. falling upon someone in ambush.”10 This is invention, 
derived perhaps from acquaintance with the kinds of violence that take place on roads, but not 
from anything explicit in the Greek. On καθελών he notes that Demosthenes “uses the phrase for 
ἀνελών or ἀποκτείνας,” and that others do too.11 They may, but in Demosthenes’ formulation, 
ἄκων (in an athletic event) and ἀγνοήσας (in war) are circumstantial and describe subject and 
action. The participle καθελών must do the same and so is not likely to mean simply “kill” (“If 
someone kills by killing”?). Finally, Harpokration notes that Demosthenes uses the phrase “ἢ ἐν 
ὁδῷ καθελών for ‘by ambush’ and ‘by trap’. And they say that such also is the Homeric ‘or 
coming down the road.’”12 But the Homeric phrase that he quotes appears once (Il. 1.151) and 
simply denotes travel on a road. The semantic distance between these two phrases is great; it is 
not clear what Harpokration meant to show. His comments bespeak guesswork, and perhaps 
some confusion too.13  
 There is nothing implausible in the suggestion that even Demosthenes or the author of the 
Ath.Pol. omitted discussion of the clause because they too did not understand it. Athenian law 
had its share of old and odd words. In a case that turned heavily on the constructed meaning and 
interpretation of words, Lysias charged that his opponent was “so dim-witted that he cannot 
understand what is being said,” and then proceeded to “teach” his opponent a thing or two about 
                                                
5 Carawan 1998: 92-96, quotes at 94 and 96. 
6 Known to Harpokration (citations below) and the author of P.Berol. inv. 5008 [Trismegistos 59647] (see 
Gibson 2002: 157-171, esp. 160, 165-166), attested in P.Mich. III 142 [Trismegistos 59552]. 
7 Canevaro 2013: 69.  
8 Drerup 1898: 277; as Canevaro 2013: 69n129 notes, with regard to the latter possibility, Weil 1886: 209n5 had 
reached the same conclusion. 
9 Gibson 2002: 165. Canevaro too (2013: 69), following Drerup 1898; also Ruschenbusch 1960: 150n106. 
10 Harp. s.v. Ἢ ἐν ὁδῶι καθελών: ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐνεδρεύοντα ἑλὼν, τουτέστι ἔν τινι ἐνέδρᾳ καταβαλών· Δηµοσθένης 
ἐν τῷ κατ’ Ἀριστοκράτους. 
11 Harp. s.v. Καθελών: Δηµοσθένης ἐν τῷ κατ’ Ἀριστοκράτους φησὶν “ἢ ἐν ὁδῷ καθελών” ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀνελὼν ἢ 
ἀποκτείνας. ἐχρήσαντο δὲ οὕτω τῷ ὀνόµατι καὶ ἄλλοι, ὡς καὶ Στησίχορος ἐν Ἰλιοπέρσιδι καὶ Σοφοκλῆς ἐν Εὐµήλῳ. 
12 Harp. s.v. Ὁδός: Δηµοσθένης ἐν τῷ κατ’ Ἀριστοκράτους φησὶν “ἢ ἐν ὁδῷ καθελών” ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐν λόχῳ καὶ 
ἐνέδρᾳ. τοιοῦτον δὲ εἶναι καὶ τὸ Ὁµηρικόν φασιν “ἢ ὁδὸν ἐλθέµεναι.” εἰ δὲ ψιλωθείη ἡ προτέρα, σηµαίνει τὸν 
βαθµὸν, ὡς παρὰ Λυσίᾳ ἐν τῷ κατὰ Φιλίππου, εἰ γνήσιος ὁ λόγος. 
13 Gibson 2002: 165 suggests that Harpokration’s reference to the alleged Homeric parallel may arise from 
conflation of καθελών and ἐλθών. 
a string of obscure, archaic words.14 “Realities are the same now as of old,” he concludes, “but 
some words we just don’t use the same now as previously.”15 Fine, but how many jurors would 
have known already that ἀπίλλειν meant simply ἀποκλείειν? The word is attested only in a 
passage of Lysias and the entry in Harpokration that quotes it.16 How many would have known 
that one swears an oath by Apollo with ἐπιορκέω, an apparently unique use of a verb that to most 
will have indicated a false oath!17 How many would have known that where the law specifies 
that “money shall be stasimon at however much the lender wishes,” stasimon did not imply 
“placing on a balance, but exacting interest.”18 Technical meanings can be clear at the time and 
opaque centuries later. 
 This, I suggest, was the case with this use of καθαιρέω. Its root meaning is clearly 
physical, ‘tearing down,’ and that persists. But in archaic and classical Greek it often denotes 
utter destruction, obliteration. In Homer “ruinous fate destroys one in long-painful death.”19 
Time obliterates everything.20 The gods destroy men like Paris.21 Hekataios recommends naval 
build-up on such a scale as to require total exhaustion of all of Kroisos’ dedications at 
Branchidae.22 Korinth eradicated piracy.23 Panakton was razed.24 The Greeks obliterated the 
power of Priam.25 A tragic chorus cheers the slaughter of Aigisthous.26 The list of examples 
could go on, and on. This was not the verb for self-defense against robbers. It signaled total 
destruction rather than the lethal reactions of a surprised pedestrian.  
 Furthermore, the clause is held to describe a form of justifiable homicide. “Lawful” 
homicide in Athens conformed to one of two fact patterns, in which the killing was what we 
might, for convenience, call either justifiable or inadvertent. The former inhered where one slew, 
                                                
14 Lys. 10.15: ἐγὼ τοίνυν, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ὑµᾶς µὲν πάντας εἰδέναι ἡγοῦµαι ὅτι ἐγὼ µὲν ὀρθῶς λέγω, τοῦτον 
δὲ οὕτω σκαιὸν εἶναι ὥστε οὐ δύνασθαι µαθεῖν τὰ λεγόµενα. βούλοµαι οὖν αὐτὸν καὶ ἐξ ἑτέρων νόµων περὶ τούτων 
διδάξαι, ἄν πως ἀλλὰ νῦν ἐπὶ τοῦ βήµατος παιδευθῇ καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ὑµῖν <µὴ> παρέχῃ πράγµατα. 
15 Lys. 10.20: ἀλλ’ εἰ µὴ σιδηροῦς ἐστιν, οἴοµαι αὐτὸν ἔννουν γεγονέναι ὅτι τὰ µὲν πράγµατα ταὐτά ἐστι νῦν τε 
καὶ πάλαι, τῶν δὲ ὀνοµάτων ἐνίοις οὐ τοῖς αὐτοῖς χρώµεθα νῦν τε καὶ πρότερον. 
16 Lys. 10.17: τὸ ἀπίλλειν τοῦτο ἀποκλῄειν νοµίζεται, καὶ µηδὲν διὰ τοῦτο διαφέρου; Harp. s.v. Ἀπίλλειν: 
Λυσίας ἐν τῇ κατὰ Θεοµνήστου, εἰ γνήσιος, “ἀποκλείειν νοµίζεται.” 
17 Lys. 10.17: τοῦτο τὸ ἐπιορκήσαντα ὀµόσαντά ἐστι. 
18 Lys. 10.18: Νόµος: “τὸ ἀργύριον στάσιµον εἶναι ἐφ’ ὁπόσῳ ἂν βούληται ὁ δανείζων.” τὸ στάσιµον τοῦτό 
ἐστιν, ὦ βέλτιστε, οὐ ζυγῷ ἱστάναι ἀλλὰ τόκον πράττεσθαι ὁπόσον ἂν βούληται. 
19 Hom. Od. 2.100, 3.238, 19.245: µοῖρ’ ὀλοὴ καθέλῃσι τανηλεγέος θανάτοιο. 
20 Aes. Fr. 469 [Radt]: χρόνος καθαιρεῖ πάντα γηράσκων ὁµοῦ. 
21 Aes, Ag. 396-402: λιτᾶν δ’ ἀκούει µὲν οὔτις θεῶν, / τὸν δ’ ἐπίστροφον τῶν / φῶτ’ ἄδικον καθαιρεῖ· / οἷος καὶ 
Πάρις ἐλθὼν / ἐς δόµον τὸν Ἀτρειδᾶν / ἤισχυνε ξενίαν τράπε/ζαν κλοπαῖσι γυναικός. 
22 Hdt. 5.36: εἰ δὲ τὰ χρήµατα καταιρεθείη τὰ ἐκ τοῦ ἱροῦ τοῦ ἐν Βραγχίδηισι, τὰ Κροῖσος ὁ Λυδὸς ἀνέθηκε, 
πολλὰς εἶχε ἐλπίδας ἐπικρατήσειν τῆς θαλάσσης. 
23 Thuc. 1.13.5: τὰς ναῦς κτησάµενοι τὸ λῃστικὸν καθῄρουν. 
24 Thuc. 5.42.1:  τὸ µὲν Πάνακτον ὑπὸ τῶν Βοιωτῶν αὐτῶν καθῃρηµένον ηὗρον. 
25 Hdt. 1.4:  Ἕλληνας δὲ Λακεδαιµονίης εἵνεκεν γυναικὸς στόλον µέγαν συναγεῖραι καὶ ἔπειτα ἐλθόντας ἐς τὴν 
Ἀσίην τὴν Πριάµου δύναµιν κατελεῖν. 
26 Eur. El. 876-878: νῦν οἱ πάρος ἁµετέρας γαίας τυραννεύσουσι φίλοι βασιλῆς / δικαίως, τοὺς ἀδίκους 
καθελόντες. This, just before he walks on stage carrying the dead body. 
for example, a man who was ‘with’ a woman in one’s household, or a would-be tyrant, or a 
condemned and exiled killer who had returned to Athenian soil. Inadvertent homicide was 
different: a boxing match gone wrong, the unfortunate killing of a comrade in battle.27 At Dem. 
23.53, “ἐν ὁδῷ καθελὼν” is flanked by two forms of inadvertent homicide, all three expressed in 
the same fashion: ἐν + dative + circumstantial participle. This trio precedes a clear example of 
justifiable homicide. The law as quoted, I urge, did not jumble the two classes; the first three 
scenarios are of a common type, all of them instances of inadvertent lawful homicide. 
 If this is right, then the phrase ἐν ὁδῷ καθελὼν should refer to a type of accidental killing 
that happens on a road and can inflict ruinous damage on a person. Thalheim suggested 
accidental ejection of a person from a mountain road.28 The more obvious candidate, I suggest, is 
vehicular homicide.29 Such deaths happened.30 And anyone who has witnessed a car running 
over a pedestrian knows that the action on the victim’s body can rightly be described as ‘pulling 
down.’ The clause, then, had nothing to do with self-defense against robbers who lay in ambush. 
Rather it protected drivers and passengers of carriages, carts, horses and the like from charges of 
intentional homicide when they accidentally ran over pedestrians in the road.31 But this was an 
old use of the verb, and by the fourth century BC a different term may have been current. 
Demosthenes and the author of the Ath.Pol. may not have known what to make of the phrase, 
and by Harpokration’s time one could only guess. 
 Antiquity’s most famous highway killing is the backstory to its most famous play. Where 
three roads meet, father drove at son and son killed father, neither knowing what ills would come. 
Some have thought that an Athenian audience might regard Oedipus as innocent of murder: he 
was waylaid in the road and acted in self-defense.32 But Harris has argued that Athenian 
theatergoers would have understood that Laios and driver had not laid in “ambush,” and that 
Athenian law would not have recognized their killing as justified and lawful. The driver shoved 
and Laios goaded, but Oedipus slew. For the audience member who was inclined to think in 
terms of Athenian law, Oedipus was guilty of intentional homicide.33 
                                                
27 For recent discussion see Harris 2010: 131-133. 
28 Thalheim 1894: 50n4. 
29 A possibility considered but rejected by Carawan 1998: 92. Ruschenbusch 1960: 150 describes this scenario 
as “Wegsperre” (road-block), finding a possible parallel at Lex Francorum Chamavorum [MGH Font. iur. Germ. 
VI] XLI: Si quis viam publicam clauserit, in fredo dominico solidos 4. I do not understand how this scenario is 
thought to concern homicide. 
30 Some were memorialized on stone, for example the tragic death of a seven year-old (I.Parion 52, with Robert, 
Hellenica X 276-282), or that of a prized pig (I.Epidamnus T527); the accident that resulted in the death of the latter 
is depicted in the relief that accompanied the epitaph: Daux 1970: 611 fig.1. See also the shocking description of a 
person crushed beyond recognition by a collapsed freight vehicle at Juv. Sat. III 257-261; compare with Maiuri, 
NSER 48 (quoted at Robert, Hellenica X 282). 
31 Carawan 1998: 92 asks how law on highway killings of any sort suited “public policy in the same way that 
athletics, military service, and defence of the oikos against sexual violation called for legal safeguards.” A great 
question. One thing that seventh-century athletes, hoplites, and carriage drivers/passengers have have had in 
common is economic status. Laws set policy but also reflect the interests of constituencies. These three potentially 
common and highly visible types of tragic accident may have loomed large in elite Athenians’ minds. 
32 See at Harris 2010: 122-123. 
33 Harris 2010: 136-137: guilty, at least insofar as the narrative at OT 800-813 suggests; see also Sommerstein 
2011 for an extended response and discussion of Oedipus’ guilt and self-defense. 
 But if the clause addressed inadvertant vehicular homicide, as I suggest, then that same 
legally minded audience member will not have contemplated the possible innocence of Oedipus, 
in whose version of events Laios and the driver initiated the violence by “driving [Oedipus] off 
the road.”34 What if, that Athenian might wonder, the collision had been accidental? In that case, 
a more direct, lethal strike would have brought the father neither guilt nor pollution, and so 
spared the son the very same. All the more tragic. 
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